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• What is Risk?
• Credible and Baseline risk
• Breakdowns of Risk in Space Systems
• Risk vs. Possibility 
• Balanced Risk
• Perspectives of Risk (Stakeholder, Developer)
• Risk as a Development Tool
• Acceptance of Risk at Different Levels and Times
• Risk Classification
• What is Class D?
Agenda
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• Establishment of the level of risk tolerance from the stakeholder, with 
some independence from the cost
– Cost is covered through NPR 7120.5 Categories
• If we were to try to quantify the risk classification, it would be based on a 
ratio of programmatic risk tolerance to technical risk tolerance. 
– For Class A, we take on enormous levels of programmatic risk in order to make 
technical risk as close to 0 as possible. The assumption is that there are many 
options for trades and the fact is that there must be tolerance for overruns.  
– For Class D, there will be minimal tolerance for overruns and a greater need to 
be competitive, so there is a much smaller programmatic risk “commodity” to 
bring to the table.
• The reality is that the differences between different classifications are 
more psychological (individual thoughts) and cultural (longstanding team 
beliefs and practices) than quantitative.
• There is one technical requirement from HQ associated with risk 
classification: single point failures on Class A missions require waiver.
What is Risk Classification?
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• Class A: Lowest risk posture by design  
– Failure would have extreme consequences to public safety or high priority national science 
objectives.  
– In some cases, the extreme complexity and magnitude of development will result in a system 
launching with many low to medium risks based on problems and anomalies that could not be 
completely resolved under cost and schedule constraints.
– Examples: HST and JWST
• Class B: Low risk posture
– Represents a high priority National asset whose loss would constitute a high impact to public 
safety or national science objectives
– Examples: GOES-R, TDRS-K/L/M, MAVEN, JPSS, and OSIRIS-REX
• Class C: Moderate risk posture
– Represents an instrument or spacecraft whose loss would result in a loss or delay of some key 
national
science objectives.
– Examples: LRO, MMS, TESS, and ICON
• Class D: Cost/schedule are equal or greater considerations compared to mission 
success risks
– Technical risk is medium by design (may be dominated by yellow risks).  
– Many credible mission failure mechanisms may exist. A failure to meet Level 1 requirements prior 
to minimum lifetime would be treated as a mishap.
– Examples: LADEE, IRIS, NICER, and DSCOVR
Risk Classification—(NPR 7120.5 Projects)
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• NPR 7120.8 “class”—Technical risk is high 
– Some level of failure at the project level is expected; but at a higher level (e.g., program 
level), there would normally be an acceptable failure rate of individual projects, such 
as 15%.   
– Life expectancy is generally very short, although instances of opportunities in space with 
longer desired lifetimes are appearing.  
– Failure of an individual project prior to mission lifetime is considered as an accepted risk 
and would not constitute a mishap. (Example: ISS-CREAM)
• “Do No Harm” Projects—If not governed by NPR 7120.5 or 7120.8, we 
classify these as “Do No Harm”, unless another requirements document is 
specified 
– Allowable technical risk is very high.  
– There are no requirements to last any amount of time, only a requirement not to harm the host 
platform (ISS, host spacecraft, etc.).  
– No mishap would be declared if the payload doesn’t function. Note: Some payloads that may be self-
described as Class D actually belong in this category. (Example: CATS, RRM)
Risk Classification—(Non-NPR 7120.5 Projects)
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7120.8 and “Do No Harm” Projects are not Class D
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• Stepping from A, B, … “Do No Harm” results in:
– More control of development activities at lower levels; people actually doing 
the work
– Less control by people who are removed from the development process
– Less burden by requirements that may not affect the actual risks for 
the project
– More engineering judgment required 
– Less formal documentation (does not relax need to capture risks nor does it 
indicate that processes should be blindly discarded)
– Greater understanding required for reliability and risk areas to ensure that 
requirements are properly focused, risk is balanced to enable effective use 
of limited resources, and that good engineering decisions are made in 
response to events that occur in development
– Emphasis on Testing/Test results to get desired operational confidence 
– Greater sensitivity to decisions made on the floor
Risk Classification Trends
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• Agency compliance view (SMA):  NPR 8705.4
– High level attributes
– Major change coming soon
• SMD Implementation:  Jan 2018 Town Hall and Lightfoot memo
• SMD SMA practices:  SMD Class D MAR
• GSFC NPR 7120.5e tailoring:  Class D Constitution
• GSFC SMA Practices:  
– GPR 8705.4
– Class D MAR templates
• What should it mean philosophically?  
What is Class D?  Depends on your view
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(Outgoing) NPR 8705.4:  Guidelines
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Attributes Actions
SPFs allowed
Limited engineering models and flight spares
Qual testing for safety compliance and interface 
compatibility.  
Level 3 parts or Center PMP
Safety-driven reliability analyses
Closed-loop GIDEP
Formal software assurance insight, no IV&V
Materials based on safety requirements, proper 
applications, and assessment of limited life items
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• What is Class D by strict definition? = Highest risk posture for 
missions governed by NPR 7120.5
• What is Class D not?—A catch-all for projects that are not 
NPR 7120.5 Classes A-C 
• GSFC Class D Constitution was a document that addressed some of 
the programmatic processes such as management structure, waivers, 
etc.
• GPR 8705.4 and the SMA organizational structure address the 
technical SMA processes
Class D at GSFC
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• Do:
– Streamline processes (less formal documentation, e.g., spreadsheet vs. formal 
software system for waivers, etc.)
– Focus on tall poles and critical items from a focused reliability analysis
– Capture and communicate risks diligently
– Rely more on knowledge than requirements
– Have significant margin on mass, volume, power (not always possible, but 
strongly desirable)
– Have significant flexibility on performance requirements (not always possible, 
but strongly desirable)
• Don’t:
– Ignore risks!
– Reduce reliability efforts (but do be more focused and less formal)
– Assume nonconforming means unacceptable or risky
– Blindly eliminate processes
Class D (and below)—Dos & Don’ts
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• Highly constrained (as is typically the case for Class D) projects do 
not have the resources to perform all of the standard activities for 
mission success
• Overconstrained situations tend to prompt engineering and SMA 
personnel to prioritize efforts as a matter of course
• Unfortunately, many are drawn to activities that may not buy down risk 
as effectively as others, and further may drive up programmatic risk, 
so as to increase the overall level of risk (technical, programmatic, 
safety) for the project without effectively improving the likelihood for 
mission success.  
• Hence, a useful activity is to prioritize mission success activities in 
terms of their criticality in ensuring safety and the effectiveness in 
buying down technical risk for the resources consumed or the 
programmatic risks taken to implement them.  
Prioritization is critical
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Risk can be characterized by number of defects that affect performance or reliability
and the impact of each. Defects are generally of design or workmanship. 
Note: A thorough environmental test program will ensure most risks are programmatic (cost/schedule) until very late, when time and money run out.
Defects vs Mission Success
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Generally-representative example, prioritization may vary 
by mission attributes or personal preference or experience.
DNH   7120.8
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Defects vs Mission Success as a function 
of risk classification
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• GSFC implementation of NPR 8705.4
• Risk Classification Definitions
• Nonconformance handling
– Do not reject without understanding the risk
– Determine cause of NC before reproducing the item 
(even from different vendor)
• Guidelines for activities vs mission class
• One element used to develop project Mission Assurance 
Requirements vs mission class
• How does a project demonstrate that they are developing a 
Class “X” product?
• How do we convey to a vendor what we expect for Class “X”?
GPR 8705.4
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Mission Success Activities vs. 
Risk Posture (example elements)
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*Excerpt from GPR 8705.4
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• Nonconformance handling
– Is the requirement that is not met important for the current project in 
its environment?
– Is the nonconforming item critical?
– What is the risk for this project of the nonconformance?
• Cost/schedule
• Technical
• Work orders and procedures
• Anomaly resolution
– Documentation
– Root cause analysis
– Lessons learned for same project or others
Other Activities With Cost & Risk 
Reduction Implications to dial up or 
down
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– Insight vs Oversight
• GMIP by exception based on unknown/problematic vendors and/or critical products 
with limited history
– Commercial practices as a rule
– Risk-based review planning
– Risk-driven vs Requirements-driven
– Sound and robust risk management
– Reduced formality in documentation
– Emphasis system test over piece part screening
– No compromise on safety of personnel or public
Class D general philosophy
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• Simple design (few critical elements)
• Short mission life
• Clear and static science objectives and goals
– Sufficient, but not overreaching
• Robust design (tolerant to variance in workmanship)
• Stable and repeatable manufacturing processes (with known 
process variances)
• High Margins (to allow more design flexibility)
– Mass
– Power
– Volume
– Specifications:  Dimensions, Materials 
• Prior flight experience (with critical components in the 
same environment)
Best Applicability of a Streamlined 
Class D Approach
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Uncertain vs Statistical Risk
Risks acceptable for Class D
Uncertainty-based Risk:
- Alternate practices
- Reduced testing margins
- Use of COTS parts and 
components with limited history
- Blind single-string design
Statistically-based Risk:
- Heritage similarity
- Prior failure/anomaly history
- Reliable design
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• Risk is an essential element of Space System Development
• Risk Classification is generally about priority and payoff on the 
stakeholder side and trades of resources and programmatic risks to 
buy down other programmatic risks and technical risks on the 
developer side
• Class D is more of a philosophy and general approach than a set of 
requirements.
Summary
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Backups to Draw From
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Risk as a Development Tool
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Preliminary Risk 
Assessment
Product 
Development and 
Deployment
Project Risk 
Database
Project 
Communication 
to Stakeholders
Requirements 
Development
Risk Identification
Prioritization of 
Resources
ATP/Resource 
Allocation
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Cost vs Time to eliminate a defect
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Removing layers results in some defects not being caught, and some being caught later.
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The more layers that are removed, the later defects are likely to be caught 
(if they are caught), the more work that has to be “undone”, the more testing 
that has to be redone, and the more likely the project is to suffer severe 
programmatic impact and/or to fly with added residual risk.  
Time at which defect is caught Launch 
date
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• Class A missions can have Class D elements
– Non-critical
– Highly redundant
– Deliveries with acceptable “defects”
• Class D mission can have Class A elements
– Critical elements
– Only available 
– Spares from other projects
Risk Classification—All Levels
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Science Mission 
(NPR 7120.5)
Research/Technology 
(NPR 7120.8)
Do No Harm
• Cost > = mission 
success
• Schedule flexible 
(low priority)
• ~6 mo.–2 yr. life
• Project failure = 
mishap
• Medium technical risks 
(may fly with many 
yellow risks)
• Very low cost 
individual projects
• Schedule flexible 
(low priority)
• High technical risk
• Very short lifetime 
(< ~3 months)
• Success is determined 
over multiple projects, 
e.g., 85% success over 
one year’s worth
• Project failure is not 
a mishap
• Only requirement—do 
no harm to personnel 
or other property 
(e.g. ISS)
• Schedule flexible 
(low priority)
• Very high technical risk
• Lifetime is best effort
• Project failure is not 
a mishap
Class D (and below) Categories
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• GSFC directives and standards (more detail in backup)
– A dozen or so GPRs, Center wide PGs and standards for workmanship, 
environmental test, and GOLD rules
– Mostly handled by common practices
– Risk classification is not handled well for those that have significant impact
– Software requirements are the biggest burden, without particular basis 
in risk
• NASA directives and standards
– Numerous NPRs, NPDs, and standards
– Similar statement to above applies
• Engineering resource budgeting—not closely tuned to 
streamlined implementation
Center Challenges and Perceived Challenges 
for Low Cost Implementation In-house at GSFC
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The GSFC Quality Triangle
27
Commodity Risk Assessment
• Risk based usage guidelines
• Risk layering requirements per risk class
• Nonconforming and out-of-family item risk assessment
• Learning through risk assessments, research, 
and testing
Quality Engineering
• Upfront involvement in design
• Design for manufacturability
• Assurance of process engineering and qualified processes
• SME support for supply chain management
• Inspection
• Nonconformance and problem identification in 
developed hardware/software
Management Systems
• ISO and AS9100 quality
• NCR follow-ups with vendors
• Audits and assessments
• Supply Chain Management
• Lessons learned capture
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Commodity: Tangible or intangible entity that has a major impact on risk, 
cost or schedule for GSFC projects
• Expert in key discipline area with background and experience with reliability 
and risk
• Responsible and empowered to assign risks based on warnings, alerts, environments, 
and “what we are stuck with”
• Establishes testing programs and protocols to keep up with current design practices 
and common parts and components
• Sets the policies for the risk-based decisions on use of parts, components, 
and processes 
• Establishes layers of risk reduction based on risk classification 
(ownership of GPR 8705.4)
• Determines the acceptability and risk of alternate standards or requirements, 
or deviations and non-conformances
• Answers, “are we okay?”, “why are we okay?”, “how okay are we?”
• Provides risk assessment to the project for the project to decide how they 
want to disposition
CRAE: Commodity Risk 
Assessment Engineer
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• Standard Spacecraft Components
• Printed Circuit Boards
• Digital Electronics (especially FPGAs and ASICs)
• Power Systems
• Capacitors/inductors
• Transistors
• Resistors
• Hybrid microcircuits
• Optocouplers
• On-board processors
• Workmanship/Printed Wiring Assemblies/Packaging/Components
• Software
• Materials
• Radiation
• Environmental testing
• Contamination
• Connectors
• ESD
Commodity Areas
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The process of applying limited resources to maximize the chance for 
safety & mission success by focusing on mitigating specific risks that 
are applicable to the project vs. simply enforcing a set of requirements 
because they have always worked
What is Risk-Based SMA?
30
Risk-based SMA is now GSFC policy—GPR 8705.4
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• Upfront assessment of reliability and risk, e.g. tall poles, to prioritize how resources and 
requirements will be applied
• Evaluating all risk categories (safety, technical, and programmatic) together to assure all factors 
are considered
• Early discussions with developer on their approach for ensuring mission success (e.g., use of 
high-quality parts for critical items and lower grade parts where design is fault-tolerant) and 
responsiveness to feedback
• Judicious application of requirements based on learning from previous projects and the results 
from the reliability/risk assessment, and the operating environment (Lessons Learned—multiple 
sources, Cross-cutting risk assessments etc.)
• Careful consideration of the approach recommended by the developer
• Characterization of risk for nonconforming items to determine suitability for use—project makes 
determination whether to accept, not accept, or mitigate risks based on consideration of all risks
• Continuous review of requirements for suitability based on current processes, technologies, and 
recent experiences
• Consideration of the risk of implementing a requirement and the risk of not implementing 
the requirement. 
Attributes of Risk-Based SMA
31
Note: Always determine the cause before making repeated attempts to 
produce a product after failures or nonconformance's
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• Were requirements imposed based on an understanding of the risks 
within a project?
• What are the risks associated with the enforcement of requirements?
• What is the risk associated with a particular nonconformance?  
• Should we immediately assume that a nonconforming item is risky for 
the application? 
• In many cases there is a good reason why a product is nonconforming
Risk of Conformance vs. 
Risk of Nonconformance 
32
Do not reject a nonconforming item without understanding the risk.
Determine the cause of NC before reproducing the item.
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• Definition: the combination of 
– a) the probability (qualitative or quantitative) that an undesired event will 
occur, and
– b) the consequence or impact of the undesired event
– In short, risk is an expectation of loss in statistical terms
• Flavors of risk (consequences)
– Technical (failure or performance degradation on-orbit)
– Cost ($ it will take to fix the problem)
– Schedule (time to fix the problem)
– Safety (injury, death, or collateral damage)
What is Risk?
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Context
• Structured risk statement
• Likelihood
• Consequence
Anatomy of a Risk
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Concern
Statistics
Impact/Criticality
Uncertainty
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• Risk is the common communication language between all of the 
technical and nontechnical disciplines in a project
Risk as a Common Language
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Schedulers
RISK
Science 
Team
Systems 
Engineering
GN&C
Thermal Electrical
PM
Finance
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• Baseline risk: the normal level of risk in developing and assembling 
a product
– This can be considered as risk that is accepted by a project initiation 
without further tracking or debate
– Generally we do not track risks within the baseline
– Experienced developers mitigate baseline risks
• Credible risk: risk having likelihood category of at least “1” on the 
pertinent risk scale (note that in GSFC’s risk scale there are 
5 categories and 1 is the lowest risk category)
– There are an infinite number of risks that are not credible 
for any project
Baseline and Credible Risk
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• Risk can be broken down in many ways 
• Within space systems such breakdowns are necessary to address 
various concepts
– Risk classification
– Risk-based engineering and SMA
– Risk-informed or risk-based decision making
• The following charts will illustrate some of these breakdowns
Breakdowns of Risk in Space Systems
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Uncertain vs Statistical Risk Breakdown
Uncertainty-based Risk:
Risk based on the unknown:  we 
haven’t tried this or tried it this 
way before
Dominated by “Unknown 
unknowns”
Statistically-based Risk:
Risk based on prior history, 
known failure rates
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Uncertain vs Statistical Risk
Detailed elements
Uncertainty-based Risk:
- Alternate practices
- Reduced testing margins
- Use of COTS parts and 
components with limited history
- Fear of the unknown
- Blind single-string design Statistically-based Risk:
- Heritage similarity
- Prior failure/anomaly history
- Reliable design
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• Failure modes and mechanisms can appear through
– Analysis and simulation
– Observation
– Prior experiences 
– Brainstorming “what if” scenarios
– Speculation
• These all constitute possibilities
• There is a tendency to take action to eliminate severe 
consequences regardless of the probability of occurrence
• When a possibility is combined with an environment, an operating 
regime, and supporting data, a risk can be established—this is core to 
the engineering process
• Lack of careful and reasoned analysis of each possibility in terms of the 
conditions that results in the consequence and the probability of 
occurrence will result in excessive cost and may increase the overall risk
Risk vs. Possibility
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Balanced Risk
(maintaining a level waterbed)
• A systems approach of looking across all options to ensure that 
mitigating or eliminating a particular risk does not cause much greater 
risk somewhere in the system
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Try to maintain the level waterbed
Pushing too hard on individual risks can cause other risks to be inordinately high
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• General safety requirements dictate that anything considered "safety" 
requires 3 inhibits.
• Unfortunately, many elements prior to launch vehicle separation that are 
tied solely to mission success are put under the safety umbrella.  
• This means that by default, many items such as premature deployment of 
solar arrays or other appendages are 
considered a safety issue for the on-orbit 
portion, even if they have no range safety 
effect, and they prompt a decision that it is 
always better to have more inhibits even if 
such a design prompts an even greater risk 
of mission failure due to one of the inhibits 
not releasing.  
• Ultimately, under the guise of “safety” we 
may end up with a less reliable system that 
is not more safe if we are not diligent with 
system-level thinking
Unbalanced Risk Example
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Reliability 
with 3 inhibits
Reliability
without 3 inhibits
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Perspectives of Risk—What Attributes 
are Used to Paint the Risk Picture?
• Well-established requirements and 
processes followed
• Assessment from independent 
review team
• Project risks presented
• Problem records
• Waivers
• Early design phase brainstorming
• Experiences in integration and test
• Project risks tracked
• Team internal dynamics and confidence
• PI/PM/systems engineer confidence
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Stakeholder Developer
What do you mean you’re not following the 
NASA Lifting Standard?
We know how to do this—we’ve done it before.
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• The primary stakeholder(s) (MDAA, Center Director, NOAA, user 
community, etc.) accept(s) risks for project mission success
• Risk acceptance is delegated to the project to manage real-time, 
day-to-day development
– Stakeholder has right of refusal through risk communication
• Safety and Mission Assurance ensures the risks are properly 
captured and communicated 
• Many risks based on programmatic concerns are accepted from 
day one
• Most technical risks need not be accepted until launch 
– Many risks involve items that are buried into a system such that removal 
will be very painful and are for all intents and purposes accepted early on
• Programmatic risks that have not been fully mitigated will frequently 
become technical risks, i.e., there may be a latent defect that survived 
through I&T
Risk Acceptance at 
Different Levels and Times
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• GMIPs (consistent with NPR 8735.2B)
– No predefined set of GMIPs
– Based on upfront negotiation considering
• assessment of developer’s own inspection points
• developer identified risks
• project identified risks; and furthermore in response to events, such as failures, 
anomalies, and process shortfalls that prompt a need for further inspection.  
– Will be coordinated with the project to maximize efficiency and minimize 
schedule impact
• Inherited items process
– Allows a holistic, risk-based process based on
• Prior history
• Changes from previous (in H/W, S/W, operation, environment)
• Past anomalies 
– Allows prior processes to be used without waivers
– Decisions to use or impose additional tests, etc., based on risk
SMD Class D MAR (agency solution):  
Significant departures from common 
practices (1/3)
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• Workmanship
– Required to follow only IPC-610 and J-STD-001X, where X is rev E or later
• With further option to follow proven, comparable developer practices
– Other standards for reference or information 
• EEE parts
– based on 
• Prior usage of the part and qualification for the specific application
• Manufacturing variability with lots and from lot to lot for parts
• Traceability and pedigree of parts 
• Reliability basis for parts.  
– All DLA MIL-SPEC or EEE-INST-002 level 3 compliant parts acceptable 
without additional actions
SMD Class D MAR (agency solution): 
Significant departures from common 
practices (2/3)
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• Radiation
– Emphasis on radiation-tolerant design 
– Part-by-part analysis and testing otherwise
• Printed Wiring Boards
– Use own preferred standard
– Project retains coupons or spare boards until mission disposal
SMD Class D MAR (agency solution): 
Significant departures from common 
practices (3/3)
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• ARB/MRB/FRB
– Government notified and invited to participate in type I (form, fit, function)
– Type II – Government given access to, but timely notification not required
• Reliability
– Project completes reliability analysis (e.g., FTA, FMEA) for faults that may 
lead to injury to personnel or the public, or produce orbital debris, or that 
may affect host platforms
– Parts stress and derating analysis per EEE-INST-002
• Software assurance
– NASA-STD-8739.8 and IEEE 730 used as guidelines*
• Software safety
– Safety critical elements determined from the hazard analysis and range 
requirements
• GIDEP:  project shall take action to mitigate the effects of alerts on the 
project
SMD Class D MAR (agency solution): 
Minor departures from common practices
*will require discussion w/SW assurance
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SMD view of Class D
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IN DEVELOPMENT
TROPICSLunaH-Map
Class D Examples
IN FLIGHT
MarCO
MinXSSCYGNSS RAVAN
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• Low priority
• Low to medium 
significance
• Short mission lifetime
• Medium / low complexity
• Low cost
• Few to no launch 
constraints
• Re-flight opportunities
• High priority
• High significance
• High to medium 
complexity
• Medium mission lifetime
• High to medium cost
• Medium launch 
constraints
• Medium priority
• Medium significance
• Medium to low complexity
• Short mission lifetime
• Medium to low cost
• Few launch constraints
• High priority
• Very high significance
• High complexity 
• Long mission lifetime
• High cost
• Critical launch 
constraints
• No re-flight 
opportunities
CLASS A CLASS B CLASS C CLASS D
SMD Portfolio Defined
Cassini
Webb
Europa Clipper
Mars 2020
Juno
Landsat-9
InSight
OSIRIS-REx
Parker Solar Probe
MMS
ICESat-2
TESS
GRACE Follow-on
ICON
CYGNSS
NICER
TROPICS
GeoCarb
ECOSTRESS 8
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Accepting higher risk for scientific gain by implementing a tailored, 
streamlined classification approach 
MANAGING RISK 
WHILE MEETING 
THE MISSION
Reviews
Performance 
Measurements
Documentation
Tech 
Approach
Class D Strategy Implementation
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SMD Implementation
Reviews
•Lifecycle Reviews conducted by project implementing 
institution
•Only two NASA required reviews during the Project 
development lifecycle 
•Delegated Decision Authority
•Review Teams as small as practicable
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•Only final documentation submitted to NASA HQs 
for approval; no preliminary documentation
•Final Project documentation approved at the 
Division Director level
•Merging documentation encouraged
•Tailoring Mission Assurance Requirements (MAR), 
with a goal to reduce documentation deliverables 
and reviews 
SMD Implementation 
Documentation
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SMD Implementation 
Performance Management
• Formal Earned Value Management (EVM) and a 
certified EVM system is not required
• NASA will develop only one NASA ICE/ISE
• KDP-C decision will be made based on 60% confidence 
levels, and not based on the usual 70%
• 7 Basic principles apply: Per Robert Lightfoot memo 
9/26/14, AO website:
https://soma.larc.nasa.gov/standardao/
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